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Abstract
The European Directive on the EU ETS allows governments to auction up to 10% of the allowances issued in
phase II 2008–2012, without constraints being specified thereafter. This article reviews and extends the long-
standing debate about auctioning, in which economists have generally supported and industries opposed a
greater use of auctioning. The article clarifies the key issues by reviewing six ‘traditional’ considerations,
examines several credible options for auction design, and then proposes some new issues relevant to auctioning.
It is concluded that greater auctioning in aggregate need not increase adverse competitiveness impacts, and
could in some respects alleviate them, particularly by supporting border-tax adjustments. Auctioning within
the 10% limit might also be used to dampen price volatility during 2008–2012 and, in subsequent periods, it
offers the prospect of supporting a long-term price signal to aid investor confidence. The former is only possible,
however, if Member States are willing to coordinate their decision-making (though not revenue-raising) powers
in defining and implementing the intended pricing mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
Whether governments could or should sell emission allowances, instead of giving them out for
free, was one of the most hotly contested aspects of negotiating the original EU ETS Directive.
It resulted in the compromise – after determined intervention by the European Parliament to
raise the threshold – that governments could auction up to 5% of allowances in phase I and up to
10% in phase II (the Kyoto first period of 2008–2012).
This compromise reflects two empirical facts about auctioning. The first is that economists
almost unanimously recommend more auctioning. The second is that business tends to oppose
it. The result is that despite all the academic recommendations, auctioning in emission trading
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systems is the exception rather than the rule.1 In phase I, only four out of 25 Member States used
auctions at all, and in only one case were auctions fully employed to the 5% limit.2 This contrasts
sharply with, for example, the willingness of European governments to auction licences for the
European ‘third-generation’ (3G) mobile telecommunications licences, where auctions raised
enormous sums.3 The difference in approach can largely be explained by three factors. First,
Box 1. Auctioning in the EU ETS – key findings
Auctioning in general:
• is likely to increase the macroeconomic efficiency of the EU ETS and offers scope to
partially address its distributional impacts
• will have negligible competitiveness impacts
• reduces the distortions associated with free allocation and is correspondingly more
compatible with EU State aid legislation
• will have a smaller impact on EU ETS prices than allocation cutbacks without auctioning
• will increase management attention and thus market efficiency
Auctioning may also provide a hedge against projection uncertainties, reduce price
volatility, and increase investor stability. The recent EU ETS market collapse is a dramatic
manifestation of uncertainty in emission projections. Reserving some allowances for
periodic auctions:
• could assist transparency and liquidity
• offers a potential price cushioning mechanism (as in US transmission auctions), to
create a more stable EU ETS market
• might facilitate ex-ante agreed target price ranges, thereby increasing predictability
for investors
Auctioning poses no significant implementation difficulties:
• either ascending-bid or sealed-bid auctions could be used and based upon extensive
experience, for example with securities auctions
• should be open to as wide a group of bidders as possible
• the concerns of small bidders can be addressed, for example through reserves
guaranteed at the strike price
For the longer term (post-2012), auctioning could also:
• help protect industrial competitiveness by enabling WTO-compatible border-tax
adjustments
• help provide a long-term carbon price signal by recycling revenue into carbon contracts
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emissions trading imposes costs on other sectors, producing strong lobbying by incumbents in
these markets, whereas costs to other sectors by pricing the 3G spectrum were much smaller and
less obvious. Second, emissions trading may affect national competitiveness in some export
sectors. In contrast, competitiveness fears did not arise with the 3G auctions because international
trade in spectrum licences (and downstream sectors) is obviously rather limited. Third,
telecommunications is a fast-growing industry, where many powerful players were non-incumbents
without the right to grandfathered allowances (Cramton and Kerr, 2002).
However, the political dynamics relevant to emissions allowance auctions may be changing.
The great majority of participants in phase I (as measured by turnover or emissions) are making
substantial profits from the system of free allocations, as economists had predicted. Additionally,
there are now potential legal pressures arising from state aid considerations as a consequence of
these profits (see Johnston, this issue). These considerations may increase the appeal of auctions.
In this context, we re-examine the issues and arguments for and against auctioning, and also
introduce some new considerations as follows: Section 2 reviews six ‘traditional’ arguments
concerning EU allowance auctions; Section 3 considers how EU ETS auctions might be run,
including an examination of the question of auction design; Section 4 examines some new
issues, including whether auctions might reduce competitiveness exposure (through allowing
border-tax adjustments); reduce price volatility, and support long-term price signalling.
2. The pros and cons of auctioning allowances
2.1. Economic efficiency, revenue recycling and the relationship with eco-taxation
Raising revenue from environmental policy is not a new idea. The classical recommendation is
to tax activities with ‘external’ (such as environmental) costs, to make firms factor these costs
into their decisions (Pigou, 1920). A secondary benefit of such eco-taxation, in addition to
internalizing the environmental externality, is that the revenue raised can be ‘recycled’ to reduce
other distortionary taxes on labour or capital in the economy.4
Despite the economic arguments for eco-taxation, implementation has been extremely patchy
and highly contested.5 The divergence between theory and practice has gradually led to a much
deeper appreciation of the crucial importance of the political economy of instrument choice. Policy
decisions are strongly influenced, for understandable reasons, by the creation and allocation of
economic rents. Environmental taxes have struggled to win political acceptance because they attempt
to combine two difficult feats: transferring the rents created by environmental constraints to the
public purse, and providing incentives to change behaviour at the margins.6 Attempting either feat
alone, particularly the former, can generate strong opposition from powerful interest groups.
In addition to the political economy challenges, policies internalizing the carbon price (including
taxes, and trading schemes whether the permits are grandfathered or auctioned) may have
unwanted interactions with other taxes.7 For instance, imposing a carbon price by a tax or trading
scheme raises the price of energy and derived products, which (other things being equal) reduces
real wages and therefore labour supply. Some considerations and studies suggest that this indirect
‘tax-interaction’ effect more than offsets the efficiency gains from revenue recycling, although
the net effects remain disputed and context-dependent.8
But any policy that internalizes the carbon price without raising revenue (such as emissions
trading with free allocation) suffers these tax-interaction effects without the benefit of the
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revenue-recycling effect (discussed above).9 Because auctioning allowances does benefit from the
revenue-recycling effect, it is almost certainly more efficient than free allocation, within the constraints
of competitiveness effects. Thus, in practice, given that there is an emissions trading system in place,
it is obvious that auctioning has the potential to improve the macroeconomic efficiency of the system.
Of course, efficiency considerations are merely the beginning, and we now examine five
other considerations relevant to auctions, namely: the distribution of the economic rents created
by CO2 limits in the economy; competitiveness effects of auctioning compared to grandfathering;
legal considerations; dynamic incentives; and transaction costs.
2.2. Rent distribution and equity considerations
Limiting CO2 emissions puts a price on carbon and thereby increases production costs. Firms
will pass a proportion of this marginal cost increase through to consumers. The proportion passed
through depends upon the market structure.10 When allowances are freely allocated to firms,
some participating sectors will inevitably make profits.11
It is now beyond doubt that the electricity sector generally profits from free allowances under
the EU ETS, unless it is subject to direct price regulation or a regulatory threat in concentrated
markets, because generators pass costs on to electricity consumers, including non-ETS sectors
and domestic consumers. Whether other participating sectors may similarly profit depends upon
two main factors: whether they receive enough allowances to cover any increase in their cost
base; and the constraints on cost pass-through placed by international competition.12 In practice,
of course, these factors vary considerably between sectors, and indeed, companies and facilities
within sectors. Non-participating sectors with high electricity consumption (such as aluminium)
will face substantially higher costs due to higher electricity prices, and yet are not compensated
through the receipt of free allowances.
Not only does the ETS have significant distributional consequences between the various sectors
(participating or not), it is also clear that most of the economic rents from the current arrangements
ultimately accrue to shareholders of the profiting firms, who tend to be wealthier than the general
population. As such, in aggregate the current arrangements transfer resources from the poor to
the rich.13
One of the widest economic misconceptions about auctioning is that it would simply add costs
which would be passed through to ‘downstream’ companies and consumers.14 Yet if firms
maximize profits, then even with free allocation they pass on the opportunity costs of allowances
to downstream prices. Changing from free allocation to auctioning will have little impact on
product prices.15 However, because auctioning raises revenue that may be reallocated, it has,
prima facie, the potential to correct distributional impacts.
If auction revenues are employed to reduce general taxes, the distributional impacts will depend
upon the nature of these other tax changes: for example, a reduction in income tax would tend to
shift revenue from the electricity consumer to the taxpayer, and if focused on the base rate might
be somewhat progressive. Alternatively, direct dedication of the auction revenue to domestic
consumers would give consumers an income stream that increases with higher CO2 prices, thereby
compensating for product (especially electricity) price increases. This might also increase public
interest in and support for the ETS. Few generalizations are meaningful at this level, however,
since each country will have different political preferences and considerations in the context of
wider tax and consumer debates.
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If revenues are earmarked within the business sector, distributional impacts will similarly
hinge upon how these revenues are targeted. One example of national earmarking is the UK
Carbon Trust, which receives revenues from the UK Climate Change Levy that is then used to
support investment by UK companies in improving energy efficiency, and in the process of
commercializing new and emerging low-carbon technologies. The aim is both to reduce energy
costs for British companies and enhance their longer-term competitiveness by accelerating the
use of advanced technology. In general, the use of CO2 auction revenues to support R&D,
demonstration projects, regional development bodies, and possibly also supporting infrastructure,
is likely to be viable under State aid rules.
However, the use of auction revenues to mitigate the impact on downstream sectors (such as
aluminium) on a larger scale is likely to be somewhat limited by State aid considerations (see
below). Nevertheless, by introducing an additional degree of freedom, auctioning some fraction
of allowances creates the potential for a more equitable distribution of the economic rents
associated with emissions trading.
2.3. Competitiveness effects
Just as it is widely (but usually wrongly) assumed that auctions lead to increased costs on
downstream consumers, it is also widely assumed that free allocation helps to reduce potential
adverse impacts of the EU ETS on the competitiveness of European industry relative to countries
without CO2 controls.
However, many participating sectors, such as the electricity sector, are not directly exposed to
foreign competition, so competitiveness concerns are not directly relevant. Exceptions may apply
to closure and investment decisions, which are affected by the allocation of free allowances – as
illustrated at the example of the power sector in Neuhoff et al. (this issue). Furthermore, although
downstream industries are affected by increased electricity prices, it should be remembered that
the electricity price increases they face should not differ much under grandfathering or auctioning.
Competitiveness concerns arise mainly in the sectors which (i) face significant cost increases,
and (ii) are most exposed to competition from outside of the ETS. This includes industries such
as cement, steel, non-ferrous metals and some chemical products. Although the shift from
grandfathering to auctioning does not normally have much impact on costs at the margin,16 it
does affect the gross revenues of companies. Free allocation is essentially a one-off subsidy that
helps companies maintain a good balance sheet in the face of higher operating costs. Auctioning
reduces the scale of that subsidy. Alternatively, for companies which are not focused on near-
term profit maximization, free allocation provides a subsidy to fund the protection of market
share by under-pricing (e.g. limit pricing, see Smale et al., this issue), and auctioning reduces
that capacity. As such, the general conclusion is that free allocation can act as a temporary
subsidy to support firm balance sheets, but the choice between this and auctioning does not
fundamentally change competitiveness in the longer term.
2.4. Legal considerations
As grandfathering and auctioning are mechanisms which allocate valuable assets, legal
considerations are relevant. State aid considerations may place limits on the scope of free allocation.
On the other hand, legal arguments might be proposed to support the view that firms have the
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‘right to emit’, which cannot be taken from them, or that auctioning would adversely affect
decisions that were made in reliance upon previous regulatory structures remaining in place.
The view that firms have a right to compensation for the establishment of, or changes to, the
EU ETS, can be dispensed with rather quickly. It is clear that legislative bodies have the authority
to change regulatory frameworks, particularly when regulated activities are harming others; indeed,
there was never a ‘right to emit’ but only the freedom to do so until regulation provided otherwise.
The argument that investors should be compensated for decisions made prior to the EU ETS
(such as building a coal power station in 2000), relying upon the assumption that no new regulation
would enter into force, is only marginally more persuasive – it is well established that if government
has a good public-interest reason, it can restrain the use of an asset and there is no legal obligation
to compensate as long as only the use is constrained but no expropriation performed.
Even if firms have no right to compensation, governments may wish to compensate adversely
affected industry to enhance the credibility of their claims of investment certainty, and to continue
to attract private-sector investment. However, without a specific justification, payments to industry
may, prima facie, constitute State aid. A justification might be provided by analogy to the ‘stranded
cost regime’ formulated and applied by the Commission under the 1996 Electricity Directive,
which allowed for such compensation in the electricity sector. Similar arguments might be applied
to other sectors.
If governments want to compensate investors for adjustment to regulation/legislation, this
would motivate some free allocation of allowances during a transitory period to compensate
investors who made investment decisions before there was any reasonable expectation of carbon
controls. Different views exist about when this was. Most of those involved in the international
process would argue it to have been 199017 or a couple of years thereafter.18 Later relevant
landmarks include the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the EU’s Green Paper on emissions
trading in 2000, and the EU’s ratification of the Protocol and adoption of the ETS Directive in
2002. Whatever year is considered applicable, however, as time passes fewer and fewer
investments will be able to make the claim that costs were sunk before a reasonable expectation
of carbon controls.
Far from having a right to compensation, the balance of legal arguments seem heavily (and
increasingly) weighted to the view that any such compensation is prohibited under State aid
rules. Indeed, European competition law may create pressures to reduce the free allocations to
industrial emitters so that they are proportionate with the (otherwise) forgone profits from prior
to the introduction of ETS (Johnston, this issue).
Finally, requiring firms to pay for the right to pollute is consistent with the polluter pays
principle, which starts from the premise that the right to a clean environment is owned by the
public: from this basis, if firms wish to pollute the environment, they must purchase the right to
do so from the public, rather than being given it for free.
The clear conclusion is, therefore, that legal principles are a very shaky basis from which to
argue against auctioning. On the contrary, legal considerations suggest that auctions may be
favoured over free allocations.
2.5. Reducing distortions and perverse dynamic incentives
An additional problem with free allocation is that it can lead to rather perverse dynamic incentives.
For instance, if future allowances are allocated as a function of present emission levels, firms
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have an incentive to emit more now in order to extract a larger allocation in the future.19 Similarly,
if free allocation to existing installations is relatively generous, while allocations to new installations
are more restrictive (as it is in many Member States) incentives are created for plant lifetime-
extension rather than plant modernization or replacement.20 These perverse incentives are
eliminated by certain allocation mechanisms (e.g. benchmarking or once-and-for-all
grandfathering), and such problems do not arise if allowances are auctioned.
This phenomenon is examined in two other articles in this Special Issue. In the electricity
sector, Neuhoff et al. (this issue) demonstrate that the sheer value of free allocations in a
sequentially negotiated trading system makes it hard to avoid some distortionary effects. Demailly
and Quirion (this issue) also confirm that if allowances are allocated as a function of production
whether contemporaneously (as in ‘output-based’ allocation) or in the future (as with updating),
output choices are correspondingly distorted. Auctioning would obviously reduce or eliminate
these effects.
2.6. Transaction costs of allocation processes
The final ‘traditional’ area of dispute concerns administrative costs. The phase I national allocation
plans (NAPs) involved negotiation over allowances with a total asset value of almost d50 billion
per year (assuming an average price of d20/tCO2). Political decisions on how to allocate these
assets between sectors and individual installations naturally creates intensive lobby activity by
all participants in order to obtain the maximum possible share of the rents.21 The time and energy
devoted by companies, governments, and indeed consultancy and research sectors, to this
enormous rent allocation process represents huge transactional costs.22
Estimates of transactional costs must account for the fact that the allocation process imposes
significant risks upon both firms and government. Many firms fear being ‘caught short’, and
these fears may be amplified by their lack of experience and confidence in trading on the
secondary market and concerns about the future availability of permits. The government (and
the public at large) run the risk that the allocation process will end up being unfair on some
sectors, and overly generous to others. The government’s response to this risk is to devote
considerable resources to the process of ‘allocation assessment’. Furthermore, transactional costs
involved in free allocation are likely to increase in the future, as more complex allocation schemes
(e.g. benchmarking) are employed to reduce other unwanted consequences.
In principle, auctioning more of the allowances reduces the volume of free assets open to
lobbying, and therefore reduces the ‘rent scrap’ of these allocation negotiations. It would also
help both firms and government manage their real and perceived risks – firms are less likely to
be ‘caught short’ when they can buy permits at the next auction, and governments could redeploy
their resources now spent on ‘allocation assessment’. Of course, auctioning also involves
administrative and other transaction costs. Thus, whether auctioning increases the overall
implementation efficiency of the EU ETS may depend upon the design of the auctions, which
we consider shortly.
2.7. Summary of the traditional arguments
Table 1 presents a summary of the arguments considered in this section. In addition to the
reasons favouring some auctioning compared to 100% free allocation, it is notable that some
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auctioning might be preferred to simply cutting back free allocations by the same amount. If the
market is liquid and – as considered below – auctions are open to all bidders, the choice between
buying at auction and buying on the secondary market may make little difference to individual
companies. However, at the economy-wide level, auctions release allowances into the market and
thus do not raise the carbon price as much as cutbacks of the same quantity. They also have more
desirable characteristics in terms of macroeconomic efficiency, distribution and lessening of perverse
dynamic incentives, as discussed. We now examine how allowance auctions might be designed.
3. How to auction EU ETS allowances
The allocation of EU ETS allowances has several features in common with the sale of government
securities such as T-Bills and Gilts, provided that Member States do not impose strong restrictions on
participation.23 In both cases there is a large number of potential bidders and a large number of
identical goods which can subsequently be traded on a secondary market. Member States therefore
have an opportunity to create a very competitive and efficient auction environment, as in the case of
securities. Bearing in mind these similarities, we discuss some basic issues for the design of EU ETS
auctions.
3.1. Multi-unit auction design
There are many possible formats for auctions of EU ETS allowances which can be divided into
two broad types. These are ascending-bid auctions, in which bidders have the opportunity to raise
their bids during the auction, and sealed-bid auctions in which bidders submit only their final
offers. The preferred choice of format depends on the circumstances. For example, ascending-bid
auctions may be easier to understand for inexperienced bidders and have been recommended for
auctions of UK greenhouse gas emissions reductions in 2002 (Klemperer, 2004, p.135) and the
New Entrants Reserve (NER) in phase I of the EU ETS in the UK (DTI, 2005).24 However, in the
case of EU ETS allowances, as long as Member States do not unnecessarily restrict competition in
auctions (e.g. by allowing only one sector to participate in any given auction), there are many
potential bidders and sealed-bid auctions should perform well.
In a sealed-bid auction, participating bidders submit confidential bids in the form of demand
schedules, which specify how many permits a bidder would be willing to buy at any given price.
These bids are added together to form an aggregate demand curve and a market clearing price is
determined as the point at which aggregate demand equals supply. Winning bids are identified
as those above the clearing price. Figure 1(a) provides an illustration of a sealed-bid auction,
where PC denotes the market clearing price. In Section 4.2 we discuss the idea of Member States
Table 1. Summary of issues
Issue Favours
Static efficiency Auctions
Distribution of rents Auctions in theory, free allocation in practice
Competitiveness Depends upon use of auction revenues
Legal considerations Auctions
Dynamic incentives Auctions
Transaction costs Uncertain, favours auctions in medium term
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agreeing a reserve price for auctioned allowances. Figure 1(b) shows an example where this
reserve price, PMIN, binds. In the case shown, PMIN is higher than the clearing price, so not all the
allowances are sold at auction.
Two variants of the sealed-bid auction are the discriminatory and uniform-price formats
commonly used to issue government securities. The two formats differ in the payments that
winning bidders must make. In a uniform-price auction, every winning bidder pays the market
clearing price. In a discriminatory auction, every winning bidder pays its own bid for the units it
wins. For example a bidder who bids for 20 permits at d30 each and a further 10 units at d20
each pays a total of d800 if all the bids are above the market clearing price.25
Because both formats are now well established, Member States and potential bidders would
be – or could easily become – familiar with the rules of either auction. Using these familiar
formats would also address concerns about auctions being untested or over-complicated. Both
discriminatory and uniform-price formats would be feasible and low-cost for Member States.26
There are two important considerations relevant to the choice between uniform and
discriminatory formats. First, it is often argued that it is simpler for bidders to formulate bidding
strategies in a uniform-price auction, promoting participation and competition. In a discriminatory
auction, small or inexperienced bidders may find it difficult to anticipate the market clearing
price and may be deterred from bidding for fear of making costly mistakes.27 This might arise if
secondary and futures markets are illiquid and there is a great deal of uncertainty over prices.28
In the case of EU ETS allowances, one would expect greater uncertainty towards the beginning
of a trading period (e.g. in the year 2008 for the 2008–2012 period) when fewer allowance
trades will have occurred.
If low participation by smaller bidders is a concern, non-competitive bids could be permitted. A
bidder who submits a non-competitive bid is guaranteed to win the desired units in the auction. In
a uniform-price auction, the price is simply the market clearing price, while under discriminatory
pricing the non-competitive price is an average of the conventional winning bids. Bidders can
therefore limit risk by submitting non-competitive bids, particularly in discriminatory auctions.29
Figure 1. Market clearing price.
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Second, the revenue raised may differ between pricing formats. Without reflection, one might
expect uniform-price auctions to raise less revenue than discriminatory auctions, where bidders
pay their bid. However, this ignores the fact that bidders will adopt different bidding strategies
under different auction formats. In a discriminatory auction, bidders have a strong incentive to
shade (i.e. lower) all of their bids in order to avoid paying much more than they need to for each
unit. In a uniform-price auction, bidders will only shade their bids if they think that this may
influence the market clearing price. As such, it is not clear ex ante which auction will produce
higher revenues or more efficient allocations.30
Nevertheless, there is some evidence from securities auctions that uniform pricing raises more
revenue and produces less concentrated allocations (e.g. Archibald and Malvey, 1998), and it
was partly on the basis of this evidence that the US Treasury switched to a uniform-price format
in 1998. Furthermore, the UK Department of Trade and Industry expressed a preference for
uniform over discriminatory pricing in phase I NER auctions (DTI, 2005).
In summary, as long as entry by bidders is not artificially restricted, EU ETS auctions are
likely to be very competitive and efficient. There are several possible auction formats, but the
most likely candidates are the sealed-bid uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, used in
sales of government securities. The limited evidence that we have slightly favours uniform pricing,
especially as bidders appear to find uniform-price auctions more straightforward. If participation
is a concern, then non-competitive bids may be used.
3.2. Eligibility and participation
The most important objectives of auction design are to promote competition and to encourage
entry. Consequently auctions for EU ETS allowances should ensure the widest possible
participation by bidders from all sectors. Artificially restricting participation to national buyers
or specific sectors is likely to impair revenues and the efficient allocation of allowances.
Nevertheless, only one of the four governments that auctioned in phase I opened the auction
to all EU bidders. Given that allowances are readily tradable, national or sectoral bidders will
only benefit from restrictions on participation if auction prices are significantly lower than those
in the secondary market. Despite the arbitrage possibility, prices at auction may be lower than on
the secondary market if poor auction design facilitates non-competitive or collusive behaviour
by bidders. The net result would be a reduction in revenue and an implicit subsidy for bidders.31
Increasing the number of eligible bidders is desirable because it is likely to lead to greater
competition and higher auction revenues. However, even if they are eligible, small bidders are
unlikely to participate directly in auctions because of the transaction costs involved in formulating
and submitting bids. Moreover the institutions responsible for conducting the auctions face costs
in dealing with each bidder (e.g. in ensuring compliance with capital requirements or securities
regulations).
One option is to allow current dealers on the ETS secondary market to become ‘primary
dealers’ who can bid on their own account or on behalf of clients. Because these dealers would
participate more regularly than individual buyers, some transaction costs could be avoided.
Small buyers might even be encouraged to participate via a dealer when they would not be
willing or able to do so directly.
In order to prevent either primary dealers or their clients from manipulating the auction price,
limits could be set on the size of any individual bidder’s share of the allowances allocated in an
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auction. Manipulations of the secondary market (such as ‘short squeezes’) will probably
not be a major consideration, as the proportion of allowances sold at auction will be relatively
small.32
3.3. Allocation of free allowances
Obviously, auctioning allowances in phase II reduces the allowances that are available for free
allocation. Governments must determine how the remaining free allocations are distributed between
sectors. An obvious and simple approach is to reduce the allocation to all sectors by 10% (or the
proportion chosen for auction). Nevertheless, given the differential pass-through of costs between
sectors, as discussed in Section 2.2, it may be considered politically appropriate to compensate
for undesirable distributional consequences by adjusting the allocation between sectors. For
instance, sectors with higher rates of cost pass-through might receive a smaller share of free
allocation, while others would receive a more generous allocation.
3.4. Auction periodicity
The principles
How often should auctions be performed? At one extreme, the entire allocation could be sold at
the beginning of the 5-year period. Large infrequent auctions would minimize administrative
and transaction costs and might also promote competitive bidding between bidders for whom
this is the only chance to buy allowances at auction. However, we believe more regular auctions
are advisable, for a number of reasons.
Smaller and more frequent auctions are likely to encourage participation by smaller bidders.
For example, firms who wish to purchase at auction rather than on the secondary market may not
have a large enough line of credit to purchase 5 years’ worth of permits in advance. This is a
substantial asset to hold on the balance sheet and one-off auctions might deter small bidders
without ‘deep pockets’. These bidders would still trade on the secondary market, but the auctions
themselves would be less competitive.
By providing a steady injection of liquidity, more frequent auctions would limit the impact of
any individual auction on market prices. Periodic auctions might also enhance price stability and
the management of uncertainty, as discussed below in Section 4. Although market interactions
are unlikely to be problematic for phase II, where only 10% of allowances can be auctioned, the
impact on the market is likely to become more important if and as a greater proportion of allowances
are auctioned over time.33 Furthermore, smaller auctions reduce or eliminate any residual (and
probably unjustified) concern that participants with market power would buy large fractions of
the allowances and subsequently extract oligopoly rents on the secondary market. Multiple auctions
would allow other players to adjust their bids in later auctions in response to any initial strategic
purchasing by large players.
Auction frequency with 25 countries
Finally, periodicity also depends upon whether Member States coordinate their auctions. If Member
States run their auctions independently, then staggering their timing would ensure a gradual
release of liquidity. For instance, if all 25 Member States run quarterly auctions, there would be
two allowance auctions every week, which seems too frequent. Even annual national auctions
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could result in an auction somewhere in Europe every 2 weeks. At the opposite extreme, Member
States could collaborate and coordinate the timing of their auctions, as considered briefly below.
The ideal trade-off between ensuring a competitive auction with low transactions costs and
providing steady liquidity is difficult to judge before we have gained more experience with
allowance auctions. If auctions were to be based on experience with electricity markets, then a
frequent uniform price auction (e.g. weekly), would allow small participants to directly acquire
the allowances they need to cover their emissions in the auction.34 High frequency would ensure
that bidders pay a price close to the price on the secondary market at the time of emission, thus
limiting risk exposure. In electricity markets this approach has been successfully implemented
with low transaction costs (various pool type market designs).
If, on the other hand, EU ETS auctions were to be more guided by the experience of
Treasury bill auctions, then less frequent auctions (e.g. 1–3 times a year) would be envisaged. A
simple uniform price format might be employed, but less frequent auctions would also allow the
use of a wider range of auction formats. Of course, a more complex auction format, requiring
more careful preparation of the bid, would increase the costs for small players to directly
participate in the auction. Very small players are therefore likely to obtain their allowances from
intermediaries, who would provide risk hedging and other services, arguably at a cost reflected
in lower auction revenue. This approach also has the benefit of supporting liquidity in CO2 spot
markets.
Finally, note that Member States could consider auctioning in advance; auctions for 2008–2012
allowances, for example, could and probably should be held before 2008 in order to help the
market form price expectations.
3.5. Auction competition and coordination
In principle there is no reason why Member States should not hold auctions entirely independently
of each other. The question of how actions in one country might affect others would then need to
be considered; in effect, governments themselves might become active ‘market players’, judging
the timing and volume of auctions in relation to market projections, including expectations
about the auction decisions of other Member States – a kind of ‘auction competition’. It is not
clear how desirable it would be for the legal authorities responsible for forming the market to
then become active players in it, and whether this might lead to conflicts of interest. How numerous
auctions might interact with the auction method is another issue to be considered – especially if
some of the auctions are very small, enabling large players to influence the outcome.
For these and other reasons, Member States might consider ‘pooling’ auctions under the same
rules. In particular, Member States with fewer allowances to sell might decide to hold joint auctions
and to divide the revenue according to their share of the supply. Coordinating the timing of
auctions might also aid price stabilization.
The ultimate manifestation of this would be for all countries that hold auctions to pool together,
in EU-level auctions. It is unlikely that Member States would give up revenues, but that is a
separate issue; there would be nothing to prevent central EU institutions managing the auctions
and returning revenues to Member States. De-linking decisions on auctions in this way from the
revenues generated would avoid any potential conflict of interest. And to have some element of
EU-level auctions may be inescapable for some of the more ‘active uses’ of auctioning, to which
we now turn.
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4. Active auctioning: hedging, pricing and border adjustments
Section 2 set out the main debates around auctioning, concluding that these offer strong arguments
for a degree of auctioning, probably increasing over time. Section 3 indicated that there are no
significant operational problems in conducting such auctions. In our view, however, these are
not necessarily the only interesting and important benefits of auctioning. In addition to the
distributional and incentive properties, there may be other important practical roles for auctions
in the context of the EU ETS that have as yet been inadequately considered, and we now examine
these issues.
4.1. Management attention
Economic analysis tends to assume that firms maximize profits. This assumption drives the
result, noted in Section 2.2, that cost increases passed through to consumers should depend on
the marginal cost increase – driven by the carbon price – not directly by the method of allocating
allowances. In practice, although an assumption of narrow profit-maximization is not egregiously
wrong, it is an idealization that obviously does not fully capture reality. The behaviour of people
and firms embody considerable inertia and they often use heuristics and ‘rules of thumb’.35 One
relevant example from the energy sector emerges from the experience with financial transmission
rights in north-eastern USA. There it was found that the free allocation of transmission rights
dampened the industry response to price signals. To increase responsiveness subsequently, all
transmission rights were auctioned and revenues returned to the initial owners of the rights.
If the allowances given to firms cover the bulk of their emissions, there is no risk exposure
and few cash flows. In these conditions, the EU ETS may well be handled by environmental
compliance departments, particularly in smaller companies, rather than moving up to affect
investment, operational and strategic decision-making. Indeed the design of the EU ETS and its
focus on facilities itself reflects its origins in EU environmental regulation, with emphasis upon
compliance. In these conditions, the current arrangement largely allows companies to carry on
Figure 2. Uncertainty on emissions from installations covered by the EU ETS.
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emitting as they would have in the absence of the scheme. Worse, it may foster a psychology that
firms must put their main emphasis upon lobbying for all the allowances they project to be
needed, rather than on considering or implementing their real opportunities for abatement,
particularly in sectors characterized by smaller firms or lower energy intensity.
Thus, the effectiveness of the trading system might be substantially improved by mechanisms
which prompt an active response from management. Two options would appear to grab
management attention, namely cutbacks in allocation and auctioning. Allowance cutbacks are
also emerging as a way of addressing the profits accruing to the power sector.36 Given lobbying,
market uncertainty and price volatility, as well as the macroeconomic dimensions considered in
Section 2, auctioning might well be seen as the preferred method. Auctioning could help to get
the desired response to the regulation, as the increased financial flows may shift management
attention to include allowance costs when optimizing production decisions.37
4.2. Auctioning and price stability in phase II
Since the EU ETS market opened in January 2005, prices have been quite unstable: they rose
more than expected, had a couple of periods of volatility in the range d20–30/tCO2, crashed in
Spring 2006 as real data on verified emissions for 2005 were released, and at the time of writing
are oscillating wildly as governments debate options for shoring up the price. The fundamental
cause is that the projections upon which allocations were based embodied far greater uncertainty
than was acknowledged, and the cutbacks were well within the range of the uncertainty.
This is illustrated dramatically by Figure 2, which compares verified emissions (for 21 of the
25 countries covered by the EU ETS)38 – the declining line from 2003–2005 – with actual
allocations for 2005–2007, and estimates made in the run-up to the data release. Allocations
exceeded emissions by close to 100MtCO2; the gap could easily have been even bigger.39 Yet,
even as late as Spring 2006, there were retrospective estimates from a leading provider of market
intelligence that turned out to be completely wrong. The uncertainty in the original projections
upon which NAPs had been based was, of course, far wider still. This gives some indication of
the uncertainty inherent in predicting emissions and abatement responses – and hence, of prices
and costs.
Uncertainty in future allowance prices leads to delay in investment decisions. By waiting, a
company gains more knowledge about future CO2 prices, and thereby makes better decisions.
Furthermore, in the presence of price uncertainty, risk aversion is also likely to reduce
investment.40 The risk of low CO2 prices, or even a price crash due to allocations based on high
emission forecasts, represents a significant hurdle for investment in low-carbon investments.
Obviously, companies are prepared to bear risks, but they generally prefer to take risks in their
core business, where this can create strategic opportunities.41
Clearly, policies which can provide a greater degree of price stability in the EU ETS would be
valuable.42 One approach is to impose a price ceiling and a price floor on the market,43 and
auctioning could play an important role in facilitating this.
An absolute, unbreakable price ceiling could only be established if an appropriate government
institution agreed to provide an unlimited supply of permits to the EU ETS at a fixed price, which
would be difficult to align with the commitment of European Member States to their cap under
Kyoto.44 With only 10% of the allowances available to auction in phase II, there is no practical way
in which auctions could set an ‘unbreakable’ price ceiling, but auctioning could reduce the risk of
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price spikes if some allowances were held in reserve and only released on to the market in the
event that price went above some predetermined level for a certain duration. A limited auction
capacity of this nature would, however, have to address potentially serious problems of gaming the
system.45
Auctions probably offer a more ready and ‘game-proof’ approach to supporting, although not
dictating, a price floor.46 Governments could agree that part of the allowances held back for
auction would be sold above a reserve price (e.g. d15/tCO2.). Given the limited volume (because
of the 10% maximum under the Directive), this could not guarantee a particular price floor, but
it could make a useful contribution to price stability. There are two main cases to consider.
(a) Tight market. If external supply of JI and CDM credits is limited or constrained (perhaps by
additionality criteria), and if abatement is also limited or expensive, the participating sectors
may want to purchase all of the auctioned allowances. In this case the reserve price in the
auction, PMIN, translates to a price floor for ETS. Figure 3 illustrates this idea. In Figure 3(a),
without auctions, the EUA price P* is determined by the point at which the demand curve
crosses QKyoto. In Figure 3(b), 10% of the allowances are removed from circulation, and
auctioned back at or above the reserve price, PMIN. A proportion of the auctioned allowances
remains unsold, and the EU ETS price now equals PMIN.
(b) Loose market. Second, if supply of JI and CDM credits increases significantly or large emission
reductions are achieved in the ETS sector, then the allowance price could drop below the
reserve price of the auction, as illustrated in Figure 4. The auction reserve price still increases
the EU ETS price from P* to PA* (compare Figures 4(a) and 4(b)), because the withdrawal of
10% of the allowances from the market ensures that the price is higher than it would have
been otherwise.
Setting an auction reserve price would only have no impact in two unlikely situations. First, with
very weak emission targets (or extremely cheap abatement) the allowance price might drop to
Figure 3. Auctions when JI/CDM supply is not important.
CP_61_135_Hepburn.pmd 7/7/2006, 10:20 AM 151152    Cameron Hepburn, Michael Grubb, Karsten Neuhoff, Felix Matthes and Maximilien Tse
Climate Policy 6 (2006) 137–160 © 2006 Earthscan
zero, even if only 90% of the allowances are available.47 No company would purchase at auction,
and the price would remain at zero. This theoretical possibility, however, seems highly unlikely.
Second, if ETS prices are already well above the reserve price, PMIN, then the reserve price is
irrelevant – the allowances will be sold at a clearing price above PMIN. Nevertheless, even in this
situation, auctions provide indirect beneficial effects, including greater price stability ex ante,
and hence increased investment in low-carbon technologies.
Using reserve-price auctions to increase price stability is a simple mechanism that could
improve the performance of the scheme, but it would require commitment and coordination
between Member States. This is an area in which ‘auction competition’ might be problematic,
since, under certain conditions, each Member State might have an incentive to fractionally
undercut the others in its ‘reserve price’. It may be advisable for Member States to place some
fraction of their auctionable allowances in a common pool, to be auctioned at the EU-level
auctioning under the agreed price terms; revenues would then be returned to the Member State
in direct proportion to their share of the auction pool. A binding commitment would be required
to ensure that governments did not withdraw allowances from the common pool and undercut it
in the event of a soft market – something which would shatter the confidence of private-sector
investors.
Extending these ideas, auctions could be used to enhance price stability by supporting a
‘price cushion’ of the sort illustrated in Figure 4. The design for capacity markets for electricity
generation in various states of north-eastern USA indicates that it may be possible. Applying this
approach to the CO2 context suggests that governments could commit to a supply curve for
additional CO2 allowances where, for example, the first lot of allowances from the auction budget
might be sold at a minimum price of d20/tCO2, with increasing fractions of allowances sold at
gradually increasing minimum prices. This allowance supply elasticity would complement the
demand elasticity created by different abatement options and would thus contribute to a reduction
in CO2 allowance price volatility. The implementation of such a scheme in a multi-period, multi-
country auction would, however, require careful consideration. Initial price stabilization might
Figure 4. Auctions when JI/CDM supply is important.
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reduce the incentive of market participants to hedge their decisions, potentially exposing them
to even higher risk in the case that all available allowances are auctioned and prices become
more peaky.
In sum, the foregoing analysis suggests that within the current EU directive, auctions might
play a useful role in serving to support a cushion for prices, reducing volatility and increasing
investment security.
4.3 The feasibility of long-term price signals
The economics literature sets out a strong case that, in the context of a problem such as climate
change, fixing prices is more efficient than capping quantities.48 The essential argument concerns
the relative sensitivities of the benefits of mitigation, and the costs of control under uncertainty. If
the marginal costs imposed by a given quantity constraint are very sensitive to the level of constraint
(steep marginal cost schedule), but the marginal benefits of abatement are relatively insensitive to
the amount (a flat marginal damage schedule),49 then price-oriented controls are more efficient.50
Pizer (2002) finds that a price-oriented approach for near-term CO2 controls could yield enormous
net social benefits. In contrast, an equivalent absolute emissions cap is far less attractive – if the
cap turns out to be wrong, the economic costs could rise sharply and offset the environmental
benefits.
In practice, there are several reasons why pure price instruments are still rarely applied to
environmental problems.51 Given the political realities, the best feasible approach may be to
design emissions trading systems to address price uncertainties. In a multi-period system like the
EU ETS, allowing banking and borrowing creates several interesting possibilities, as discussed
by Newell et al. (2005). For instance, parties might agree that the stringency of targets in the next
period automatically depends upon the revealed price in the current period, with the relationship
being defined by the agreed target price.52
Auctions offer some additional approaches to providing a basis for a clear, long-term carbon
price signal. First, the mechanisms discussed above could be used to create a long-term ‘price
floor’. This could be implemented by auctioning all allowances with a reserve price equal to the
price floor, coupled with a government commitment to repurchase allowances at the price floor.
If credible, a price floor would increase investor confidence in the profitability of low-carbon
technology investments.
Second, Helm and Hepburn (2005) propose that the revenue from auctions could be recycled to
industry in a technologically neutral way that provides long-term carbon price certainty. They
outline a scheme in which national governments would sign ‘carbon contracts’ under which the
government would pay the private sector a fixed price (to be determined by another auction) for
the supply of emissions reductions over a long time horizon, such as 20–30 years. A key feature of
the scheme is that the ‘carbon contract’ auction would be technology-neutral, so that the government
would be able to avoid the fraught process of ‘picking winners’. Winning a carbon contract would
provide low-carbon innovators with a reliable forward revenue stream which could be employed
to secure project finance.53 Note that the use of carbon contracts would not prevent governments
from subsequently implementing a more stringent climate policy, if appropriate.54
Auctioning EU ETS allowances would provide the Treasury with the public funds to pay for
carbon contracts.55 This would be politically appealing – spending auction revenues on long-
term carbon contracts would represent genuine revenue recycling to industry in a manner that
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enhances the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS,56 and also provides a much needed
long-term price signal.
4.4 The feasibility of border-tax adjustments
A final dimension of auctioning is its relationship to competitiveness through the use of border
tax adjustments. It is difficult for energy-intensive sectors to pass through the (opportunity)
costs of CO2 allowances to product prices if these prices are set in international markets. Persistent
price differences might, therefore, drive new investors to regions not covered by stringent emission
trading schemes, as discussed more fully in Grubb and Neuhoff (this issue).
If the effective CO2 price differs between regions post-2012, investment in energy-intensive
industries is likely to gravitate towards regions with lower CO2 prices. Clearly, a stringent CO2
policy is only possible, in the mid-term, if it does not undermine the competitiveness of a region
or country. To protect competitiveness, energy-intensive sectors might be excluded from the
ETS, but this would weaken the overall scheme. Alternatively, the allocation methodology of
free allowances could be redesigned to reduce the impact of CO2 prices on product prices. But
this would distort investment and operation incentives and severely restrict substitution effects to
less carbon-intensive products, seriously undermining the effectiveness of the ETS in delivering
CO2 emission reductions.
Border-tax adjustment (BTA) may be a preferable solution to facilitate the longer term extension
of CO2 policies in the absence of global agreement (Biermann and Brohm, 2003). To make BTA
compatible with WTO principles, tariffs must be set at the average costs of CO2 allowances,
excluding opportunity costs. Average costs are only significant with auctions, and thus a move
to auctions is required to facilitate BTA. Ismer and Neuhoff (2004) suggest the following approach
to address frequently voiced concerns about WTO compatibility (Esty, 1994). Suppose a company
producing one widget, with the best available technology, emits X tonnes of CO2 and consumes
Y MWh of electricity in the process. Emission trading increases the costs of this company by X
times the allowance price and Y times the price increase of electricity due to emission trading. An
auditing body will determine the factors X and Y for the best available technology of the relevant
product groups, thus minimizing administrative efforts (Zhang, 1998). The auditing body would
consult with industry, ensuring a balanced result between the differing interests of domestic and
foreign industry. Any exporter out of the area covered by the emission-trading scheme will now
be reimbursed for these costs. Older or less efficient plants will also be compensated at the level
of the best available technology. On the flip side, a tariff at the level of these costs is levied on
imports. This reinstates a level playing field for companies irrespective of the domestic CO2
policy.
The joint implementation of stringent CO2 trading with this type of border-tax adjustment will
leave companies in foreign countries slightly better off than the absence of any scheme, while
domestic companies are slightly worse off. The joint implementation thus addresses concerns
resulting from the analysis of independent implementation of border-tax adjustment (Charnovitz,
2004). The joint scheme achieves the objective of facilitating unilateral internalization of CO2
costs, as simulated for the cement sector (Demailly and Quirion, this issue), without discriminating
against foreign producers.
However, WTO regulations mean that companies could only be compensated for the real
costs they incur as a result of the regulation – not for the marginal costs or opportunity costs that
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follow from free allocation. Thus, companies could only be compensated up to the level of
actual, average costs incurred, whereas the competitiveness issue is more to do with the impact
of marginal costs of prices, at least when firms seek to maximize profits. Auctioning helps to
bring average cost impacts in line with the marginal costs, and thus would enable a greater level
of border-tax adjustment more aligned with any actual price differentials. To implement effective
BTA, a prerequisite for WTO-compatibility is auctioning.
5. Conclusions
The traditional arguments for and against auctioning, reviewed in Section 2, support two widely
known conclusions, namely that (i) auctions are almost certainly in the public interest, but (ii)
political economy considerations have to date presented serious obstacles to the implementation
of auctioning within the EU ETS on any significant scale. The winds may be changing, however,
and more recent signs are that governments are keen to find approaches to resolve these political
challenges.
If auctions are employed in phase II, Section 3 of this article provides some broad guidance on
how this might occur. Sealed-bid auctions are likely to be appropriate, and both discriminatory
and uniform-price payment rules are feasible. Auctions could be conducted at relatively frequent
intervals (every 6 months or so) over the 2008–2012 commitment period. Market power is not
expected to be a significant problem as long as Member States do not impose artificial restrictions
on entry.
Perhaps the most interesting possibilities for auctions, though, go beyond the usual benefits of
static and dynamic efficiency. Section 4 discussed the potential for auctions (and the resulting
revenues) to provide several new benefits, including (i) an increase in the environmental effectiveness
by focusing management attention on carbon; (ii) an amelioration of competitiveness considerations,
either by direct support or by legitimizing border-tax adjustments; (iii) a clearer long-term price
signal, through recycling the revenues into carbon contracts; and (iv) an improvement to price
stability if Member States agree to coordinate auctions by including an auction price floor.
One can only speculate whether these additional considerations will increase the political
support for greater use of auctioning in phase II. Certainly, as targets become more demanding,
efficiency becomes more and more important and the appeal of auctioning will correspondingly
increase. The creative deployment of auctions to increase efficiency, stabilize prices, and help to
address competitiveness issues would be feasible, and could yield substantial social benefits.
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Notes
1 The US government auctions only 2.8% of allowances under its SO2 programme (McLean, 1997).
2 Denmark auctioned 5% and used the revenue to purchase JI/CDM credits, Hungary auctioned 2.4%, Lithuania auctioned
1.5%, and Ireland auctioned 0.75%, with European-wide eligibility, to cover the administrative costs of the scheme.
3 In the year 2000, the UK auction raised d39 billion (Klemperer, 2004) and the German auction almost d100 billion
(1 billion = 1,000 million).
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4 This corresponds to a very simplistic statement of the ‘double dividend’ hypothesis. Various definitions are used in the
literature, sometimes inconsistently, including ‘weak’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘strong’ forms. This terminology is avoided here.
Tax-interaction effects are discussed later.
5 See, e.g. Helm (2005).
6 A 2006 Special Issue of the Energy Policy Journal (34(8)) analyses the European experience with eco-taxation and points
to deeper underlying issues about the degree of public understanding and trust in political processes. A Swedish survey
also underlines that attitudes to carbon taxation are directly related to the degree of trust in politicians, more even than an
individual’s own exposure to the taxes (Hammar and Jagers, 2006).
7 See Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), the critique by Fullerton (1997) and the reply by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997), as
well as Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Goulder (1995), Parry (1995) and Bovenberg and Goulder (1996).
8 Parry (2003) finds that the tax-interaction effect dominates the revenue-recycling effect. This would be expected from the
optimal tax theory result that broad taxes produce lower efficiency losses than narrow taxes (e.g. Diamond and Mirrlees,
1971a, 1971b). In practice, the net impact depends on a wide variety of assumptions about the current tax base, whether the
economy is modelled as a fully deployed equilibrium, etc (IPCC, 2001, chs 7 and 8).
9 See Goulder et al. (1997, 1999), Parry et al. (1999) and Fullerton and Metcalf (2001). The tax interaction effect could
provide an argument for a carbon price that is below the Pigouvian level. It is not an argument for not raising revenue.
10 See the companion articles in this issue by Smale et al., Demailly and Quirion, and also Hepburn et al.
11 Indeed, Smale et al. (this issue) suggest that most participating sectors will profit.
12 There is some indication that non-power sectors with significant emission levels are also able to pass through a proportion
of the marginal cost increase. See, for instance, de Leyva and Lekander (2003).
13 Parry (2003) points out that in the USA the top income quintile owns 60% of all shares, with the bottom income quintile
owning less than 2%. A survey commissioned by Wall Street Europe concludes that in the USA 60% of households have
equity ownership, while in Europe this number is only 18%. Likewise, while in the USA 50% of the population has more
than d50k private ownership, excluding property, this compares to only 15% in Europe. (GfK Custom Research Worldwide,
Sep/Oct 2004, 14,383 people in 18 countries.)
14 Cramton and Kerr (2002) note that in the US cellular communications licence example, prices happened to fall when the
scheme shifted from free allocation to auctions because of an increase in competition.
15 Some cost differential might be expected by the logic in Section 2.5 on the perverse dynamic incentives created by repeated
free allocations. The fact that the assumption of profit maximization does not fully capture reality is discussed in
Section 4.1.
16 As already noted, an exception may apply when the allocation method has perverse dynamic effects, as discussed in
Section 2.5.
17 The publication of the IPCC’s First Assessment Report and the UN General Assembly Decision to launch negotiations on
tackling climate change.
18 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which agreed on the nature of the problem and the need for action led
by industrialized countries, was signed at the Rio Earth Summit in June 1992 and ratified by the US Senate later the same
year, and entered into force a year later. It was also in the period 1990–1992 that the EU developed proposals for a carbon
tax, later made conditional on action by other countries.
19 Additionally, if the rules provide for higher allocations to dirtier new entrants, then entrants have an incentive to construct
more carbon-intensive facilities than is economically efficient.
20 This is analogous to the ‘ratchet effect’ in economic theory (Freixas et al., 1985) and clearly reduces the efficiency of the
trading scheme.
21 The need for lobbying may exacerbate the dynamic incentive effects discussed in Section 2.5 if firms make inefficient
investment decisions to improve their bargaining position for free allowances.
22 The relative paucity of published academic work on this huge scheme is evidence of this process – most academics and
think tanks are caught in extensive consulting exercises for either government or industrial participants on the rent
allocation, rather than devoting their attention to forward-looking studies on how to create innovation, least-cost abatement
and appropriate institutional changes.
23 Eligibility and participation issues are considered in Section 3.2.
24 The 2002 auction of emissions reductions was a reverse auction in which bidders competed to sell reductions to the
government. Concerns about encouraging entry led to the use of a descending-bid auction format (the mirror image of
ascending bids in a standard auction). The fact that this was the first ever auction for greenhouse gas reductions and the
relatively small scale of the market meant that small bidders could have been deterred by the costs of having to formulate
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a strategy in a sealed-bid auction. (The small scale of the auction meant that having a non-competitive bid facility of the kind
that would mitigate these concerns would be impractical.) The government was keen to promote entry, both to increase
competition in the auction itself and to ensure a liquid secondary market (Klemperer et al., forthcoming).
25 An alternative type of sealed-bid auction is the Vickrey auction, where a winning bidder’s payments equal the bids of the
losers who would have won in the absence of his participation. The winner thus pays the opportunity cost of his bid.
Vickrey auctions are of great interest to academic auction theorists and have been shown to have desirable theoretical
properties (Ausubel and Cramton, 1998). However Vickrey auctions are much harder for participants and the public to
understand, and as long as bidders have very little market power, uniform-price auctions produce similar results.
26 This is not to say that alternatives should not be considered, or that either option is necessarily the preferred auction format
for every Member State. However the low costs of such formats (e.g. compared with ascending bids) and the fact that
Member States can draw on the experiences of securities markets suggest that discriminatory and uniform-price auctions
should be thoroughly examined.
27 One possible problem is the ‘winner’s curse’. The value of winning a tradable allowance is similar for bidders because they
will all face the same resale price on the secondary market. In this kind of ‘common value’ auction, the bidders estimate
what this price will be and bid accordingly. However the most likely to win is also the most likely to have overestimated
the price, and bidders need to shade their bids to account for this.
28 In the UK, index-linked securities (gilts) are sold in a uniform-price auction, while conventional gilts are sold using
discriminatory pricing. The Debt Management Office explicitly attributes this decision to the greater uncertainty surrounding
prices of index-linked gilts and the illiquidity of secondary markets.
29 If non-competitive bids are permitted in securities auctions they typically comprise a small proportion (about 10–20%) of
the issue.
30 There is also the possibility of ‘demand reduction’ in uniform-price auctions (Ausubel and Cramton, 2002).
31 This is then equivalent to partial grandfathering, and the various arguments discussed in Section 2 are applicable. If such
subsidies are justified in some manner, there would be better ways of delivering them than by distorting the auction design.
32 US Treasury auctions restrict bidders to 35% of supply in any auction, but these rules have occasionally been circumvented.
In 1991 Salomon Brothers admitted to submitting fraudulent bids in the names of their clients in order to squeeze short
sellers in the ‘when-issued’ market.
33 Auctioning permits all at once would increase liquidity in the secondary market. However, since only 10% of allowances
will be sold at auction, this is unlikely to be a major concern.
34 A discriminatory price auction with non-competitive bids could also be used.
35 As documented and analysed more fully in the growing literature on behavioural economics. For specific examples see
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) and Gigerenzer (2003). Of course, the use of heuristics per se is not necessarily
inconsistent with profit maximization.
36 Allowance cutbacks to power generators would reduce total allowances, increasing the allowance price. In contrast,
auctioning would not have this effect. As such, downstream sectors should clearly prefer auctioning to an equivalent
allocation cutback.
37 Auctions might also raise shareholder awareness of carbon costs, and alert them to the possibility of savings through
abatement, resulting in greater pressure on managers to reduce emissions.
38 It is assumed that Poland, the main unknown, has an 18% excess allocation, similar to Hungary and the Czech Republic.
39 Big gas price increases during 2004–2005 led to a switch back to coal in power generation, increasing emissions. This
indeed was the principal factor behind the initial increase in CO2 prices. Had gas prices stayed low, emissions from the
dominant power sector would have been lower and the gap between emissions and allocations probably even larger.
40 These are classic results of real option theory. See Baldursson and von der Fehr (2004) for a more sophisticated discussion
of the impact of risk aversion.
41 Furthermore, asymmetries in risk hedging and allocation have an impact. Utilities in the power sector (with a more conservative
risk profile and relatively restrictive allocations) have needed to buy from other sectors, which were
under no pressure to sell surplus allowances. This sellers’ market arguably inflated prices. Auctions on a regular
basis (e.g. biannually) would improve, both directly and indirectly, the liquidity of the market, by reducing this type of problem.
42 The ability to bank allowances from phase II into subsequent periods can in theory contribute to price stability; in practice,
given the present fundamental uncertainty about the nature of post-2012 commitments, this may remain a marginal
consideration for much of phase II (we return to the topic in the following section).
43 In the limit, if the ceiling and the floor are equal then obviously the allowance price would be fixed, and what was a
‘quantity instrument’ would now effectively become a ‘price instrument’.
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44 On price capping, see, e.g., Pizer (1997, 2002), Aldy et al. (2001), McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) and Jacoby and
Ellerman (2004). The EU directive prohibits ex-post adjustment of national allocation plans; hence national governments
could not sell additional allowances after the submission of these plans.
45 For example, market players might artificially create a price spike to prompt the release of allowances into the market. The
experience with speculative attacks on currency and exchange rate controls provides some important lessons.
46 An absolute price floor in the EU ETS could be established if a government institution agreed to purchase an unlimited
number of permits at a fixed price. If sellers are guaranteed this floor price by selling to the government, the market price
will not fall below the floor. Treasuries, however, are typically reluctant to sign up to such financial liabilities.
47 This would be reflected in Figure 3 by the demand curve shifting down to cut the axis in the free allocation area.
48 Weitzman (1974) and Roberts and Spence (1976) provide the canonical theory. Pizer (2002) and Hoel and Karp (2001,
2002) apply the theory to climate change, accounting for the fact that greenhouse gases are a ‘stock pollutant’ not a ‘flow
pollutant’.
49 Note that assuming a flat marginal benefits curve does not imply that damages from climate change are small. It simply
implies that damage from climate impacts do not change rapidly as a function of additional emissions. Assuming a flat
marginal damage curve is probably accurate over a short period (e.g. 5 years), because climate damages are a function of the
stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, rather than the flow of emissions. This assumption is less appropriate over
longer time-frames, and Hoel and Karp (2002) show that capping quantities becomes more attractive as the relevant policy
time horizon is increased.
50 See Hepburn (2006) for a simple presentation and review of the ‘prices vs. quantities’ literature with an application to
policy questions in health, transport, defence and the environment.
51 As noted above, taxes combine several politically difficult problems in one, and their history (as with the European carbon
tax proposals of the early 1990s) is patchy and limited. Newell et al. (2005) examine some of the problems from a
theoretical perspective. At the international level, the difficulties that would be faced in trying to establish a harmonized,
long-term, credible global carbon tax are obvious.
52 Newell et al. (2005) develop the mathematics of these approaches in detail.
53. This could lead to the development of a more sophisticated forward market for long-term allowances, in which low-carbon
innovators could hedge against future low prices by taking a short position (i.e. agreeing to provide reductions).
54 Additional policies would not erode the credibility of the contract, which is so crucial in climate policy (Helm et al., 2003),
because the price set in the long-term carbon contract is fixed and would not be affected by changes in the stringency of
other climate policies.
55 Alternative financing structures are possible. For instance, the government could require the emission reductions to be
fungible with the EU ETS, such that the liability under the carbon contracts can be offset by selling the allowances on to
the EU ETS. Alternatively, the transmission systems operator could purchase the emission reductions under the carbon
contacts, so that if any liability materializes it can be passed through to customers via transmission charges.
56 To get a rough sense of the potential improvement in environmental effectiveness offered by recycling auction revenues
into long-term carbon contracts, consider the following highly imperfect back-of-the-envelope calculation. If 50% of a
Member State’s emissions are covered by the EU ETS, then auctioning 10% of phase II allowances is equivalent to
auctioning 5% of the applicable Kyoto limit. Now suppose that the prices paid in the auction are similar to the prices the
government pays for emissions reductions delivered under the carbon contract. If the carbon contracts required delivery for
2008–2012, the government would thereby achieve an additional 5% reduction in emissions. Of course, the point of a long-
term carbon contract is to extend beyond 2012, so they would deliver less than a 5% reduction over the first commitment
period, but would also deliver emissions reductions after 2012. The net present value of the emissions reductions delivered
should be within an order of magnitude of a 5% reduction in the first commitment period.
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